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NOTE 
THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX:  
A STUDY OF U.S. V. SCHIFF AND ITS SISTER CASES   
Mia R. Yugo† 
DUKE OF VENICE: 
That thou shalt see the difference of our spirit, 
I pardon thee thy life before thou ask it. 
For half thy wealth, it is Antonio’s. 
The other half comes to the general state, 
Which humbleness may drive unto a fine. 
 
PORTIA: 
Ay, for the state, not for Antonio. 
 
SHYLOCK: 
Nay, take my life and all. Pardon not that. 
You take my house when you do take the prop 
That doth sustain my house. You take my life 
When you do take the means whereby I live.1 
    William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Shakespeare’s Shylock poses an intriguing question: At what point does 
the confiscation of wealth infringe upon one’s liberty? Given Shylock’s 
predicament, the Duke’s offer of pardon appears to be the pinnacle of 
generosity, but Shylock refutes it as a pretext, equating the seizure of goods 
and property to an infringement on personal liberty.2 For Shylock, the 
appropriation of money is merely another means of achieving the same end: 
the confiscation of life and liberty. The right to life, in other words, is 
                                                                                                                                      
 † Articles and Book Reviews Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 10. J.D. 
Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2016). Ms. Yugo would like to thank Mr. 
Charles Helm, J.D., her co-counsel at the National Tax Moot Court Competition, where they 
won Second Place, for his engaging discussions during the development of this Note.     
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act IV, sc. 1, 360-70.   
 2. In modern English, the line can be translated as:“You take my house away when you 
take the money I need for upkeep. You take my life when you take away my means of 
making a living.” 
304 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:303 
 
intricately woven with economic freedom. Without the right to earn a living 
and benefit from one’s labor, the individual becomes a serf.   
That principle was Irwin A. Schiff’s credo in his lifelong battle against the 
income tax.3 He argued that the individual income tax, as implemented in 
its current form, is an encroachment on economic freedom and thus an 
infringement on the right to life. According to Schiff, the “omnipotent 
state,” sometimes referred to as the welfare state, is the “antithesis of 
liberty.”4   
In United States v. Schiff, Schiff was sanctioned for what the courts have 
described as “frivolous appeals . . . ‘to make public his radical views on tax 
reform.’”5 The “grandfather of the tax protester movement”6  challenged the 
validity of the federal income tax, asserting that a tax on individual income 
is unconstitutional. The court disagreed. Yet, Schiff views the court’s use 
and interpretation of case law regarding the validity of the federal income 
tax a product of an “ill placed” reliance on constitutional misapplications.7 
Drawing upon Supreme Court precedent and legislative intent, Schiff paints 
a portrait of the judiciary’s role in what he views as an illegal tax regime. 
Schiff’s legal argument is fourfold: (1) the federal income tax is “not 
[directly] ‘traceable’” to the original taxing powers granted by the 
Constitution;8 (2) the Sixteenth Amendment “did not amend the 
Constitution, nor did its passage give the government any new taxing 
power;”9 (3) the absence of a statute precludes liability for income taxes;10 
                                                                                                                                      
 3. Mr. Schiff passed away in federal prison on October 16th 2015, at the age of 87, 
while this Note was near completion, in the final stages of editing. See Peter J. Reilly, Irwin 
Schiff Famed Tax Protester Dies in Prison, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2015, 10:21 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2015/10/17/irwin-schiff-famed-tax-protester-dies-
in-prison/#a9b4c4426b34.  
 4. IRWIN A. SCHIFF, THE BIGGEST CON: HOW THE GOVERNMENT IS FLEECING YOU 313 
(Freedom Books 1977).   
 5. Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Schiff v. Comm’r, 
751 F.2d 116, 117 (2d Cir. 1984)).  
 6. Peter J. Reilly, Euro Pacific Capital’s Peter Schiff Defends His Tax Protesting Father 
Irwin Schiff, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2013, 12:57 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2013/ 12/15/euro-pacific-capitals-peter-schiff-
defends-his-tax-protesting-father-irwin-schiff/. 
 7. Irwin A. Schiff, Uncontroverted Fundamental Jurisdictional Challenges Violate 
Burden of Proof Requirements and Constitutional Due Process, 7, 
http://www.takelifeback.com/irwin/ appealsup/SCOTUS/IssPres.pdf. This draft petition for 
certiorari written by Schiff explains his position on the income tax, offering a legal analysis of 
the law with reference to both case and constitutional law.    
 8. Id. at 12. 
 9. Id.  
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and (4) the term “income” in Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code refers 
to “income in its ‘Constitutional’ sense” not its “ordinary sense.”11 
According to Schiff, since the federal court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction, his conviction should have been reversed and immediate 
release effectuated.12   
This Note is a four-part legal analysis of Schiff v. United States and its 
sister cases. Section I is an introduction to Schiff. Section II is a background 
section that lays the factual foundation for Schiff’s protestation of the 
income tax, including procedural history and the origins of the tax: from 
judicial interpretation in case law up until the passage of the Sixteenth 
Amendment. Section III analyzes the validity of the current taxation system, 
applying the object and scope limitations laid out in the background section 
to the individual income tax in its current form. With Schiff v. United States 
as its backdrop, this Note traces Congress’s power of taxation to the original 
taxing powers and analyzes the passage, purpose, and actual operation of 
the Sixteenth Amendment. Under that framework, the Note assesses 
whether the individual income tax, in its current form, is a means to an 
improper end, that is, whether it is prohibited by either the Constitution or 
natural law theory. Finally, the Note concludes with a brief look into the 
First Amendment implications surrounding Schiff’s cases, and then posits a 
possible taxation alternative for what many Americans perceive as “the 
worst tax—that is, the least fair.”13  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Procedural History 
1. Tax Evasion  
Following an assessment by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
Service for “income tax deficiencies for the years 1974 and 1975,” Schiff was 
convicted of failure to pay estimated income tax and fraudulent 
underpayment.14 Schiff appealed the decision of the United States Tax 
                                                                                                                                      
 10. Id. at 5-6. 
 11. Id. at 6.  
 12. Id. at 10.  
 13. Lawrence E. Zelenak, Foreward: The Fabulous Invalid Nears 100, 73 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. i (2010) (quoting Karlyn Bowman, American Enterprise Institute, Public Opinion on 
Taxes 7–8 (2009)) (summarizing the results of ORC and Gallup polls asking respondents to 
choose from among four taxes: federal income tax, state income tax, state sales tax, and local 
property tax)).  
 14. Schiff v. C.I.R., 751 F.2d 116, 117 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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Court on three bases: (1) “he could not be penalized for fraudulent 
underpayment of taxes when he, in fact, made no payment,” (2) “the tax on 
wage income is unconstitutional,” and (3) “the Commissioner is not 
authorized to assess a deficiency if no return was filed.”15 The Second 
Circuit denied the appeal, reasoning that the appellant’s arguments were 
“wholly lacking in merit” and “without any logical basis.”16 The court 
granted the Commissioner’s request for sanctions, awarding both damages 
and double costs.17    
The prosecutions against Schiff for tax evasion and his subsequent 
appeals span nearly four decades. In 1977, only two years after the first set 
of sanctions, Schiff once again “filed no tax returns at all for the years 1977 
and 1978.”18 Schiff was convicted of failure to pay income taxes from 1976 
through 1978, and again appealed the conviction.19 Interestingly, in 1977, 
Schiff “file[d] a form 1040 . . . for the year 1976,” setting forth his name, 
address, and social security number.20 That form, however, did not set forth 
“any financial information in the relevant portions of the return” but 
instead asserted in the margins the following contention:  
I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS RETURN NOR THE LAWS 
THAT MAY APPLY TO ME. THIS MEANS THAT I TAKE 
SPECIFIC OBJECTION UNDER THE 4th or 5th 
AMENDMENTS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO THE 
SPECIFIC QUESTION.21 
Schiff’s objections continued on page two of the form, reasserting his 
belief that the federal income tax is voluntary and that there is no criminal 
statute making one liable for failure to pay federal income taxes.22 As 
recently as 2004, Schiff persistently maintained that “no law requires you to 
file income tax returns or pay this tax,” and “there are no criminal statutes 
that apply to income taxes . . . [a]nd there is no law giving federal courts 
authorization . . . to prosecute anyone for income tax ‘crimes.’”23 The Ninth 
                                                                                                                                      
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 831 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 630 (9th Cir. 2004).  
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and Second Circuits have dismissed these claims as “far-fetched”24 and 
“frivolous.”25  
a. A Dismissal of Merits  
The Second Circuit rejected Schiff’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s 
holding that Schiff’s “failure to file tax returns for the years 1976 through 
1978 was a fraudulent attempt to evade taxes.”26 The court reasoned that a 
1040 tax return, which “set forth no financial information,” is “treated as if 
no return was filed.”27 The court further found all of Schiff’s contentions to 
be “completely lacking in merit.”28   
First, the court dismissed Schiff’s argument that the income tax violates 
the original taxing powers granted by the Constitution.29 In so holding, the 
court relied in part upon Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., which held that 
such arguments are “wholly without foundation,” since it is the “command 
of the [Sixteenth] Amendment that all income taxes shall not be subject to 
apportionment.”30  
Second, the court reasoned that—contrary to Schiff’s contention—tax 
assessments do not amount to a “taking of property without due process.”31   
Third, the court held that the IRS “gave timely notice to Schiff” of a tax 
deficiency and that “when a taxpayer does not file a tax return, it is as if he 
filed a return showing a zero amount for purposes of assessing a 
deficiency.”32 Since assessments for zero returns may be filed at any time, 
the three-year statute of limitations for assessments did not apply.33  
b. Sanctions Revisited  
Zeroing in on Schiff’s unwavering opposition to Congress’s authority to 
impose a non-apportioned direct tax, the court held that Schiff’s 
contentions merited the further imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 38 
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.34 In justification, the court 
                                                                                                                                      
 24. Id.  
 25. Schiff, 919 F.2d at 831-33. 
 26. Id. at 833.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 832.   
 29. Id.  
 30. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 18 (1916).  
 31. Schiff, 919 F.2d at 832. 
 32. Id. at 832-33. 
 33. Id. at 833.  
 34. Id. at 834.  
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highlighted Schiff’s history of “attacks on the tax system.”35 Citing to Schiff’s 
previous tax evasion case, the judiciary reaffirmed its description of the 
appellant as “an extremist who reserve[s] the right to interpret the decisions 
of the Supreme Court as he read[s] them from his layman's point of view 
regardless of and oblivious to the interpretations of the judiciary.”36 Finding 
a “clear showing of bad faith,” the court once again ordered double costs 
and damages “to be paid to the United States.”37 The court further ordered a 
prohibition on any further filings to the clerk from the appellant until 
payment of the sanctions.38 The court concluded its rather short analysis of 
the merits with a mere reassertion of its previously stated contention that 
“‘[t]he payment of income taxes is not optional . . . and the average citizen 
knows that the payment of income taxes is legally required.’”39  
Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the sanctions did not have the 
deterrent effect the court intended. Rather than withdraw from what the 
courts have repeatedly dismissed as ill-placed convictions, Schiff pressed on. 
Not only did he continue his zero returns, he also penned books explicating 
those views—eventually becoming the grandfather of a movement.40  
2. First Amendment Restrictions  
Despite repeated incarceration, Schiff remained firm in his convictions. 
Most recently, in United States v. Schiff, the Ninth Circuit noted that Schiff 
has maintained consistent opposition to the federal income tax for “over 
thirty years.”41 The court held that Schiff’s belief in the “voluntary” nature of 
the income tax—also outlined in his book, The Federal Mafia—is 
“fraudulent commercial speech” not protected by the First Amendment.42 
Because Schiff’s speech “organize[d], market[ed], or promote[d] [a] tax 
evasion scheme,”43 the court held that the prohibition on the sale and 
promotion of such material was properly restricted and consistent with the 
First Amendment. The court reasoned that the advertisement of a “tax 
                                                                                                                                      
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. (quoting United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 835.  
 39. Id. at 834.  
 40. See Reilly, supra note 6.  
 41. United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 2004). See generally Schiff, 919 
F.2d at 834; United States. v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1986); Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 
460 (8th Cir. 1985); Schiff v. Comm’r, 751 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Schiff, 
647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 42. Schiff, 379 F.3d at 629.  
 43. Id. at 624. 
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avoidance scheme” demonstrates a strong likelihood of future violations of 
the Internal Revenue Code.44 Furthermore, the court viewed the 
perpetuation of this scheme as a serious threat to the validity of the federal 
income tax due to “consumer confusion.”45 In balancing Schiff’s First 
Amendment interest against the state’s interest in reducing tax avoidance, 
the court found in favor of the state, reasoning that his commercial speech 
was rightly limited because it was deemed fraudulent.46    
B.  Origins of the Income Tax  
1. “Income” Defined   
All U.S. citizens, residents and nonresidents, must pay individual income 
tax on their taxable income,47 which is defined as “gross income minus 
deductions . . . .”48 Under Cook v. Tait, Congress has power to impose taxes 
upon income received by “native citizen[s] of the United States” who were 
domiciled in a foreign country “at the time the income was received.”49 The 
reach of Section 61 not only stretches beyond the nation’s borders, but also 
applies to noncitizens within its borders. Nonresident aliens “engaged or 
considered to be engaged in a trade or business in the United States during 
the year” must file an income tax return.50 The nonresident alien must 
                                                                                                                                      
 44. Id. at 626.  
 45. Id. at 630.  
 46. Id.  
 47. I.R.C. § 1 (2015). 
 48. I.R.C. § 62. I.R.C. § 61 defines “gross income” as:  
[A]ll income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the 
following items: (1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, 
fringe benefits, and similar items; (2) Gross income derived from business; (3) 
Gains derived from dealings in property; (4) Interest; (5) Rents; (6) Royalties; 
(7) Dividends; (8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments; (9) Annuities; 
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts; (11) Pensions; (12) 
Income from discharge of indebtedness; (13) Distributive share of partnership 
gross income; (14) Income in respect of a decedent; and (15) Income from an 
interest in an estate or trust.  
I.R.C. § 61. All income derived from these sources is taxable income. Some items, however, 
such as income acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance or proceeds from life 
insurance contracts paid by reason of the death of the insured are, for policy reasons, 
specifically excluded from gross income. See generally I.R.C. §§ 101-139A. 
 49. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 54 (1924).  
 50. See IRS, Taxation of Nonresident Aliens, (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/ 
Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Taxation-of-Nonresident-Aliens. A nonresident alien is 
defined as “an alien who has not passed the green card test or the substantial presence test.” 
Id.   
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report all income “effectively connected” with their trade or business and all 
“U.S. source income that is ‘fixed, determinable, annual, or periodical 
(FDAP).’”51  
Under the current federal taxation system, all income derived from the 
non-exhaustive list of fifteen sources listed in Section 61 of the I.R.S. Code 
is taxed at a progressive rate. For single persons earning between $0 and 
$9,225, the 2015 marginal income tax rate is 10%.52 For persons earning 
between $37,450 and $90,750, the rate is 25%.53 For persons earning 
$413,200 and over, the rate is 39.6%.54 The higher the value of the property 
acquired, the higher the rate of taxation.  
Failure to pay results in either “failure-to-file” or “failure-to-pay” 
penalties.55 Although “reasonable cause” may, in some circumstances, 
excuse persons from penalties, “willful neglect” on the part of the taxpayer is 
punished to the fullest extent of the law.56 In some cases, the consequence of 
willful neglect is incarceration.  
The existence of this system, in its current form, is not in dispute. Schiff 
does not question its existence, but rather its faithfulness to its original 
purpose. Two issues lie at the heart of America’s individual income tax 
system: (1) What is the basis for the government’s power to tax individual 
income? and (2) Does the current system of taxation comport with the 
spirit of the law, as envisioned by the Founders?  
2. Original Taxing Powers  
a. Schiff’s First Argument: Traceability  
Schiff’s first argument is that the individual income tax is “not [directly] 
traceable” to the original taxing powers granted to Congress by the 
Constitution.57 The Constitution contains three original clauses pertaining 
to taxation. Article I, Section 8 grants the federal government the power to 
“lay and collect” taxes.58 This power, however, is limited by two additional 
clauses. Article I, Section 2, clause 3 imposes upon Congress the Rule of 
                                                                                                                                      
 51. Id.  
 52. See Kyle Pomerleau, 2015 Tax Brackets, (Oct. 2, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/ 
article/2015-tax-brackets. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. IRS, Failure to File or Pay Penalties: Eight Facts, (Apr. 17, 2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Failure-to-File-or-Pay-Penalties:-Eight-Facts.  
 56. Id. (emphasis added).  
 57. See Schiff, supra note 7, at 7.  
 58. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.  
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Apportionment, mandating that direct taxes must be apportioned among 
the several states. Article I, Section 9, clause 4 further dictates that no direct 
tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration.59 Hence, 
any non-apportioned, direct tax is unconstitutional.   
By contrast, indirect taxes, including duties, imposts, and excises, must 
be levied according to “geographic uniformity.”60 Any tax falling under this 
class of taxation need not be apportioned among the several states.  
The crux of the matter is the proper classification of the individual 
income tax. Schiff contends the individual income tax is not imposed as 
either a direct or indirect tax.61 “Since the individual income tax is not 
imposed pursuant to either class,” he states, “it is not a tax authorized by the 
Constitution, and thus cannot be legally enforced by any federal court . . . 
.”62 In other words, he argues the income tax is unconstitutional because (a) 
it is a direct tax, (b) direct taxes must be apportioned among the states, (c) 
the income tax is not apportioned, and therefore, (d) the income tax is 
unconstitutional. This, in Schiff’s view, is the limitation imposed on 
Congress by the Constitution’s “original taxing powers.” Since the 
Constitution does not give Congress authority to impose non-apportioned 
direct taxes, the income tax is therefore not “directly traceable” to the 
original taxation clauses. 
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in its 1895 decision in Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., which was later vacated, but is essential to 
analyze since its reasoning is the basis upon which Schiff and the tax 
protester movement rely.  
 (1) Pollock Introduced: An Unconstitutional Direct Income 
Tax  
The origins of the federal income tax date back to the formation of the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue in the 19th century. In 1862, “President Lincoln 
and Congress . . . created the position of commissioner of Internal Revenue 
and enacted an income tax to pay war expenses.”63 However questionable 
the legality of this measure at the time, it was enacted as temporary relief for 
the war effort. Ten years later, the tax was repealed.64 But the respite was 
                                                                                                                                      
 59. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 4. 
 60. Schiff, supra note 7, at 8.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. IRS, Brief History of IRS, (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Brief-History-of-
IRS.  
 64. Id.  
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brief. In 1894, 22 years after the repeal, Congress “revived the income tax.”65 
One year later, in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., the Supreme 
Court struck down the income tax as unconstitutional.66 
The Pollock Court held that the 1894 tax was a “constitutionally 
impermissible unapportioned direct tax.”67 The majority held that the 
“whole law of 1894 should be declared void and without any binding 
force.”68 The Court reasoned that the federal government’s tax on income 
from real estate, rents, and profits was outside the power of Congress 
because it was “not imposed by the rule of apportionment according to the 
representation of the [s]tates, as prescribed by the Constitution.”69 The 
Court similarly held that the taxation of bonds and securities of the states 
and municipal bodies was “beyond the power of Congress.”70 Since the 1894 
income tax was a direct tax not apportioned among the several states 
according to population, the tax was declared void. Thus, the original taxing 
power of the Constitution limited the right of taxation. Any direct tax levied 
in violation of the rule of apportionment was declared unconstitutional:   
The inherent and fundamental nature and character of a tax is 
that of a contribution to the support of the government, levied 
upon the principle of equal and uniform apportionment among 
the persons taxed, and any other exaction does not come within 
the legal definition of a tax.71 
A tax levied upon income but imposed unequally was deemed an 
“arbitrary and capricious” exercise of legislative power.72 Hence, the Court 
struck down the tax, declaring it a “shackle . . . upon state powers.”73   
 (2) Pollock Reinterpreted  
Contrary to the interpretation of tax protesters, some scholars interpret 
Pollock as validating taxation of income from employment.74 In so arguing, 
                                                                                                                                      
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. See generally Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).  
 67. Zelenak, supra note 13, at iii (citing Pollock, 157 U.S. 429).  
 68. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 607-08.   
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 608.  
 71. Id. at 599 (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. at 600.  
 73. Id. at 602.  
 74. See, e.g., Christopher Jackson, The Inane Gospel of Tax Protest: Resist Rendering 
Unto Caesar-Whatever His Demands, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 312 (1996). Jackson states, “In 
2016] INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 313 
 
these opponents partly rely on Justice White’s dissenting opinion in Pollock, 
which states, “[I]t is expressly decided that the term [direct tax] does not 
include the tax on income.”75 It is admitted, however, that the precise 
meaning of direct taxes, “in the sense of the Constitution” is “a question not 
absolutely decided.”76 The dissent expressly acknowledges that “at the very 
birth of the government a contention arose as to the meaning of the word 
‘direct’” but that the “controversy was determined by the legislative and 
executive branches of the government.”77 The dissent then outlines the 
construction of the term “direct,” relying on decades of judicial 
adjudication to conclude that “direct taxes within the meaning of the 
constitution were only taxes on land and capitation taxes.”78 The “long and 
settled practice” of construing direct taxation in this manner is, from the 
dissent’s viewpoint, unjustly overthrown.79  
To declare, as the majority does, that the “vast sums” of money “collected 
from the people of the United States” through the income tax were 
wrongfully taken renders the government vulnerable to claims for “an 
enormous amount of money.”80 The economic repercussions of a 
declaration of invalidity were evidently the heart of the dissent’s concern. Its 
constitutional interpretation, coincidentally, alleviates that concern. For 
critics of the tax protester movement, the Sixteenth Amendment does away 
with the concern entirely.  
b.  Schiff’s Second Argument: Income in its ‘Constitutional’ v. 
‘Ordinary’ Sense  
Schiff’s second justification for “zero returns” is based on a 1921 
Supreme Court decision, Merchants’ Loan & Trust Company v. Smietenka.81 
According to Schiff, Merchants’ Loan & Trust provides a crucial distinction 
between income in its “constitutional” sense and income in the “ordinary” 
sense.82 
                                                                                                                                      
Pollock, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that taxes on income from one's employment 
are not direct taxes and are not subject to apportionment.” Id.  
 75. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 635 (White, J., dissenting).  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 636.  
 78. Id. at 637.  
 79. Id.   
 80. Id.  
 81. Schiff, supra note 7, at 16 (citing Merchant’s Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietenka, 255 
U.S. 509, 520 (1921)).  
 82. Id. at 17.  
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At issue in Merchants’ Loan is the meaning of the word “income” within 
the Income Tax Act of 1916.83 The plaintiff, a trustee of property under a 
will, challenged the classification of capital assets of an estate as income 
under (1) the 1916 Income Tax Act and (2) the Sixteenth Amendment.84 
The question posed to the Court was whether the proceeds of the sale of 
corporate stock by testamentary trustees was income within the meaning of 
the Constitution and subsequently, the Income Tax Act.85  
The plaintiff argued that the “appreciation in value of the capital assets of 
the estate” did not constitute “income” within the meaning of the Sixteenth 
Amendment.86 The gain or profit at issue, according to the plaintiff, did not 
satisfy the requirements of income classification in the constitutional sense. 
This was because the income from the proceeds of the sale of the stock were 
never received: the widow did not receive it, the children did not receive it, 
and the trustee did not receive it.87 Consequently, the plaintiff asserted that 
the “increase in value of the stock could not be lawfully taxed under the act 
of Congress.”88 Since the appreciation in value was never received, it should 
never have been classified as income.89  
Two bases were offered in support of the plaintiff’s exclusion of the 
increase in value of the stock as income: First, the instrument that created 
the trust—a will—required that “stock dividends and accretions of selling 
value shall be considered principal and not income.”90 Second, the Supreme 
Court already stipulated that the type of gain or profit at issue in Merchant’s 
Loan & Trust was not contemplated to be “income” in the constitutional 
sense.91 Under Eisner v. Macomber, “the ‘common understanding’ [of] the 
term ‘income’ does not comprehend such a gain or profit as we have here, 
which it is contended is really an accretion to capital and therefore not 
constitutionally taxable . . . .” 92  
With regard to the definition of income provided in the will, the Court 
disregarded the instrument, reasoning, as a general rule, that “[i]t [is] not 
                                                                                                                                      
 83. Merchant’s Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietenka, 255 U.S. 509, 514 (1921) 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 509. 
 87. Id. at 515. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 514-15. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 515 (citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)).  
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within the power of the testator to render [a] fund non-taxable.”93 With 
regard to the meaning of income in its constitutional sense, the Court 
turned to precedent and noted that “[t]he question is one of definition and 
the answer to it may be found in recent decisions of this [C]ourt.”94  
One of the earliest formulations of “income” in its constitutional sense is 
found in Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert. There, the Court defined 
income as “[a] gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined.”95 This definition, however, was later expanded. As the Court 
notes, the term income was defined with more particularity in cases “arising 
under” the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 and the Income Tax Acts.96 
That definition, according to the Merchants’ Loan Court, is controlling. 
The most notable addition came in Eisner v. Macomber where, as noted, 
the Court defined “income” as “a gain derived from capital, from labor, or 
from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained 
through sale or conversion of capital assets.”97 The Court reasoned that this 
definition of income under the Corporation Excise Income Tax Act of 1909 
logically carries over to the Tax Act of 1913.98 “There would seem to be no 
room to doubt that the word must be given the same meaning in all of the 
Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise 
Tax Act and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by 
decisions of this court.”99   
Schiff’s view, therefore, is that the Merchants’ Loan decision made clear 
that “[i]ncome in its ‘constitutional sense’ . . . means, ‘income separated 
from its source.’”100 If there is no separation, then the “income tax falls 
directly on the source (i.e. the property that generated the income),” hence 
“qualif[ying] it  as a ‘property tax’ rather than an ‘income tax.’”101 The 
enforcement of the income tax by federal courts is therefore 
unconstitutional, Schiff argues, because any “tax on the income from real 
and personal property is unconstitutional and void if not apportioned.”102 
                                                                                                                                      
 93. Id. at 516. 
 94. Id. at 517.  
 95. Id. at 517 (quoting Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415 (1913)) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
 96. Id. at 518.  
 97. Id. at 518 (quoting Eisner, 252 U. S. at 207) (internal quotations omitted).  
 98. Id. at 518-19.  
 99. Id. at 519.  
 100. Schiff, supra note 7, at 18. 
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Hence, Schiff argues that Howbert, Eisner, and Merchants’ Loan render the 
individual income tax unconstitutional by definition.  
Unlike Pollock, Merchants’ Loan was decided in 1921, after the passage of 
the Sixteenth Amendment. Thus, Schiff argues that when income cannot be 
separated from its source, any un-apportioned tax such as today’s 
individual income tax is unconstitutional notwithstanding the Sixteenth 
Amendment.103  
3. The Sixteenth Amendment: Passage and Purpose  
a. Passage  
In 1909, the Sixteenth Amendment was submitted to the states for 
ratification.104 Four years later, on February 25, 1913, the Amendment 
passed with more than three-fourths of the necessary support.105 With 
Wyoming on board, the three-quarter-majority requirement was satisfied 
and the Constitution amended.106 Only four states, Connecticut, Florida, 
Rhode Island, and Utah rejected it. 107  
The Sixteenth Amendment states: “The Congress shall have power to lay 
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without 
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census 
or enumeration.”108 When Wyoming finally ratified the Amendment in 
1913, its passage, according to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, “gave 
Congress the authority to enact an income tax.”109 The original law, 
however, is a far cry from today’s Internal Revenue Code.   
The original law, as Schiff explains, contained a mere fourteen pages and 
“levied a delicate tax of 1 percent, graduated as follows: 2 percent on 
$20,000-50,000, 3 percent on $50,000-75,000, 4 percent on $75,000-
$100,000, 5 percent on $100,000-$250,000, 6 percent on $250,000-$500,000, 
and 7 percent thereafter.”110  Its primary purpose, according to the IRS, was 
to tax the wealthy in order to “pay war expenses.”111  
                                                                                                                                      
 103. SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 254. 
 104. Id. at 253.  
 105. Id.   
 106. Brief History of IRS, supra note 63. 
 107. SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 253. 
 108. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 109. Brief History of IRS, supra note 63. 
 110. SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 254 n.1.  
 111. Brief History of IRS, supra note 63.  
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b. Purpose 
 (1) War Expenses 
The purpose of the original 1862 income tax was to pay war expenses 
during the American Civil War.112 When the war ended, that purpose could 
no longer be served. Thus the tax was repealed ten years later—and again 
rendered unconstitutional after a revival in 1894.113 The purported purpose 
of the 1913 Tax Act, however, is not as clear. Paying war expenses is 
certainly one of the purposes served by the tax. In 1918, for example, the top 
rate was increased to seventy-seven percent to “help finance the war effort” 
during World War I, then dropped to twenty-four percent in 1929, then 
rose again during the Great Depression.114 Evidently, a portion of the 
revenue raised was indeed used to fund war efforts, but since the tax has 
remained in force long after the First World War, paying war expenses may 
not have been its chief object. The query, therefore, is whether the purpose 
now served by the income tax exceeds the authority granted to Congress. 
In 2013, the federal income tax celebrated its 100th birthday. The tax 
protester interpretation of Pollock’s holding of a constitutionally 
impermissible income tax has been swept aside and the dissent’s opinion 
now reigns supreme. The “development of constitutional law” now stands 
as the primary justification for the shift from direct taxation as controversy 
to direct taxation as settled law.115  
III.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX  
 
PART I 
A. Reliance on Pollock and Merchants’ Loan 
Schiff contends the traceability argument is valid notwithstanding the 
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment.116 That four-line amendment, which 
gave Congress the power to lay and collect taxes, he argues, “did not 
automatically abrogate every other line and right secured to Americans by 
the same Constitution.”117  
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First, Schiff argues that Pollock is still valid law. Notwithstanding the 
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, Schiff argues Pollock was “never 
reversed, never overturned.”118 Hence, its limitation on Congress’ authority 
to tax is still in place. Second, Schiff argues that Merchants’ Loan & Trust—
like Pollock—is also valid, as it too was never overturned.119 Both arguments 
rest on judicial interpretation. While valid case law is indeed proper legal 
authority, judicial interpretation is subject to change. The principle of stare 
decisis, for example, does not bar a court from overturning its own decision. 
Even if the Supreme Court one day accepts Schiff’s interpretations of both 
cases (which has yet to occur), those concessions would not bar the Court 
from overturning its own holdings. For this reason, even assuming Schiff’s 
reliance on past judicial interpretation is helpful to his case (a position 
courts have repeatedly rejected), it is insufficient to render the tax 
unconstitutional, particularly when the current judiciary views all 
challenges as “frivolous” appeals of settled law.120  
Thus, as between his argumets, Schiff’s analysis of the object and 
operation of the income tax, in its current form, is his stronger 
constitutional argument. That argument is twofold. First, Schiff argues that 
if the object of the Sixteenth Amendment exceeds the authority granted by 
the People to Congress to enact laws, the tax is unconstitutional.121 Second, 
he asserts that even if the object of the Sixteenth Amendment was a 
legitimate end within the scope of authority granted to the civil 
government, its steady expansion could nonetheless render it 
unconstitutional in operation. 
PART II  
The Sixteenth Amendment: Exceeding the Scope of Authority 
Granted by ‘We the People’ 
                                                                                                                                      
 118. Schiff, supra note 7, at 17.   
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 831 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 121. See, e.g., SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 253-54. Discussing the passage of the Sixteenth 
Amendment, Schiff states: 
The U.S. electorate was tricked into voting for it because it was presented to 
them as a “soak-the-rich” scheme . . . Clearly, therefore, there has been a breach 
by the federal government of the taxing powers initially conveyed to it, which 
required a constitutional amendment. Since current levels of taxation go far 
beyond anything that consenting voters contemplated, there was, in legal 
parlance, no ‘meeting of the minds,’ and hence no contract binding the 
Sixteenth Amendment to the citizens of this republic can be assumed.  
Id.  
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A. Object: A Tax on the Wealthy or a Pretext for the Redistribution of 
Wealth?  
If the actual object of the individual income tax is a redistribution of 
wealth, Schiff argues its end is an illegitimate object, falling outside the 
jurisdiction of the federal government. According to Schiff, the Sixteenth 
Amendment, together with the creation of the Federal Reserve System, 
enabled the federal government to first create economic classes and then 
shift wealth between them.122 Schiff argues that the Sixteenth Amendment 
and Federal Reserve System “gave the federal government the means to 
plunder both [American] productivity and . . . savings.”123  By imposing 
higher taxes on wealthier individuals, the individual income tax punishes 
success. Contrary to a flat tax, the progressive taxation system separates 
individuals into classes. By imposing lower rates on lower income earners, 
the system in effect favors those who produce less and punishes those whose 
productivity earns them a higher income. The IRS calls this a “fair share.”124 
Schiff calls it unconstitutional income shifting orchestrated by “too much 
government.”125  
In short, if the actual purpose of the amendment is to redistribute wealth 
(as opposed to, for example, raising money to pay for war expenses), then 
Schiff views that purpose as illegitimate and unconstitutional for two 
reasons: firstly because he asserts people were “tricked” into voting for it 
(thinking it would only affect the rich, which it does not) and secondly, 
because that redistribution creates a system of involuntary servitude, thus 
violating the Thirteenth Amendment, as explained in the next section.126 
This object/purpose argument, as framed by Schiff, inevitably overlaps with 
his operation argument because the implementation of the tax system 
reveals its purpose.127 Simply put, the theory posits that the actual object of 
the system only became visible once it was operational. Thus, once the tax 
system was in place, the redistribution of wealth revealed itself as the true 
object of the Sixteenth Amendment, which purpose according to Schiff, 
violates the Thirteenth Amendment.128  
                                                                                                                                      
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 253.  
 124. IRS, The Agency, its Mission, and Statutory Authority, (Nov. 4, 2014), 
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B.  Operation: The Thirteenth Amendment and Involuntary Servitude 
The next argument in the tax protester movement is the belief that the 
income tax, in its current form, infringes upon the economic freedom 
secured by the Founders. As tax protestors argue, its operation falls outside 
the scope of authority granted by the People, and therefore violates the 
spirit of the Constitution—if not in object then in operation. It is on this 
ground that Schiff argues the Sixteenth Amendment was fraudulently 
presented to the American people as a “soak-the-rich scheme.”129 
Specifically, he contends the “U.S. electorate was tricked into voting for it,” 
believing it would “only affect the wealthy.”130 In support, he refers to 
statistics from 1916, detailing that “only 362,970 Americans out of a 
population of 102 million paid taxes—or less than 4/10 of one percent.”131 
By the late 1970s, that percentage climbed to fifty percent.132 Today, the 
income tax affects a large majority of the population. In 2012, for example, 
“the IRS collected more than $2.5 trillion in revenue and processed more 
than 237 million tax returns.”133 Based on statistics from the 1970s, Schiff 
concludes that the income tax, as it operates today, is unconstitutional 
because it exceeds the original intent of the Sixteenth Amendment:  
[T]here has [clearly] been a breach by the federal government of 
the taxing power initially conveyed to it, which required a 
constitutional amendment. Since current levels of taxation go far 
beyond anything that consenting voters contemplated, there was, 
in legal parlance, no “meeting of the minds,” and hence no 
contract binding the Sixteenth Amendment to the citizens of this 
republic . . . .134  
Schiff argues that even if the object of the Sixteenth Amendment was 
legitimate, the ‘actual operation’ of the federal income tax now exceeds the 
amendment’s original purpose. This absence of a consensus ad item 
(“meeting of the minds”) to which Schiff frequently refers can also be 
understood as a pretext for an unconstitutional end.  
Schiff contends that the “actual operation,” “current tax rates,” and 
“manner” in which the Sixteenth Amendment is enforced “attempt[s] to 
destroy all the rights which are secured by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
                                                                                                                                      
 129. Id. at 253. (internal quotations omitted). 
 130. Id. at 253-54 (internal quotations omitted).    
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 133. The Agency, its Mission, and Statutory Authority, supra note 124.  
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Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth amendments.”135 Of these, the 
prohibition in the Thirteenth Amendment against involuntary servitude is 
his most attractive legal basis for the unconstitutionality of the income tax 
in its current form. Another of Schiff’s constitutional arguments rests on 
the prohibition against titles of nobility in Article 1, Section 9, clause 8.136 A 
Constitution built on negative rights prohibits the federal government from 
enforcing a system of taxation that creates a privileged class of citizens 
through a forced distribution of wealth.  
Since the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, it prohibits 
involuntary servitude between individuals.137 Schiff contends that this 
prohibition applies not only between individuals, but “denie[s] such a 
relationship to the state as well.”138 At the current rate of taxation, tax 
protesters argue that the individual income tax “attempts to reduce all 
productive citizens to peons in the service of the state.”139   
In short, the first argument asserts that if the actual object of the 
Sixteenth Amendment was to shift income from one economic class to 
another, that object would be improper because it falls outside the 
jurisdiction of the federal government. The second argument asserts that 
even if, arguendo, the original object of the Sixteenth Amendment (i.e. to 
pay war expenses, to provide financial security for seniors) was indeed 
proper, its expansion beyond that object, renders it a means to an 
illegitimate end: the redistribution of wealth through involuntary 
servitude.140  
The Constitution “was primarily established to protect the lives, 
property, and privacy of Americans . . . .”141 Forcing higher income earners 
to subsidize lower income individuals falls outside the jurisdiction of the 
government. On July 4, 1776, the people of the several states formed a 
nation built on the unalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. The pursuit of happiness, rooted in the right to property, 
protects the fruits of one’s labor from being plundered by the state. The 
Thirteenth Amendment secures that right by prohibiting the confiscation of 
wealth, the product of one’s labor. When the state, in this case, the federal 
government, forcibly confiscates a significant percentage of one’s personal 
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income, it creates a de facto state of servitude, a form of slavery. By creating 
economic classes, the state enslaves one portion of the population to the 
other.142 The private sector is taxed at exorbitant rates while the public 
sector reaps the benefits of forced charity—the “antithesis of [personal] 
liberty.”143  
C.  Endowed by the Creator  
Another theory favoring tax protesters, albeit not articulated by Schiff, is 
natural law theory. This argument espouses that all law comes from God: 
“Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no 
authority except from God, and those authorities that exist have been 
instituted by God.”144 The Declaration of Independence, for example, 
echoes this Biblical worldview, noting that the scope of the government’s 
powers is framed by the consent of persons already endowed by God with 
certain unalienable rights: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments 
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.145 
In 1776, the sovereign of the land—the People of the United States—formed 
a nation-state by consenting to limited government, instituted among men 
to secure life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.146 Reflecting the passage 
in Romans 13, the purpose of that government was neither to grant nor 
infringe upon liberty; the sole purpose, rather, was the security of existing, 
unalienable rights already granted by the Creator. Consent is therefore 
limited to the government’s proper observance of power; when the 
magistrate exceeds its authority, consent is not withdrawn but is absent 
altogether.   
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Recall for example, the principle “lex iniusta non est lex,” meaning “an 
unjust law is not a law.”147 Although the precise origins of its wording are 
uncertain, the slogan can generally be traced back to a passage from Saint 
Augustine on the topic of free will:  
A soldier is even ordered by law to kill the enemy, and if he 
hangs back from the slaughter, he is punished by his commander. 
Shall we dare to say that those laws are unjust—or, rather, no 
laws at all? For that which is not just does not seem to me to a be a 
law” (“lex mihi esse non videtur, quae iusta non feurit” De libero 
arbitrio I v 11).148  
The “non est lex” principle is now often associated with the Thomistic 
tradition, having been refined by Augustine’s successor, Saint Thomas 
Aquinas,149 though perhaps not coined by Aquinas in precisely those 
terms.150 Applying the principle to the tax protester movement, the 
argument, in theory, is that the consent of the people is limited to laws that 
are just, and justice is that which protects the rights granted by the Creator. 
For Aquinas, “unjust laws are . . . ‘acts of violence rather than laws.’”151 They 
“bind in conscience, if at all, not per se, but only per accidens. They are 
laws, not ‘simpliciter,’ or, as we might say, in the ‘focal’ or ‘paradigmatic’ 
sense, but only in a derivative or secondary sense (‘secundum quid’).”152 
Indeed, this relationship between morality and law is the focal point of the 
positivists’ attack on natural law theory: 
If the positive law is, as all followers of the natural-law doctrine 
assert, valid only so far as it corresponds to the natural law, any 
norm created by custom or stipulated by a human legislator 
which is contrary to the law of nature must be considered null 
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and void. This is the inevitable consequence of the theory which 
admits the possibility of positive law as a normative system 
inferior to natural law. The extent to which a writer abides by 
this consequence is a test of his sincerity. Very few stand this 
test.153 
Kelsen’s critique here is, as Robert P. George states, a “familiar charge 
against natural law theory.”154 It posits that the “lex iniusta non est lex” 
principle undermines the fabric of law; to base the validity of law on the 
laws of nature would in other words, create instability and uncertainty in 
the law—two unsustainable consequences of the natural law approach, at 
least as understood [or misunderstood] by the positivists.   
In Schiff’s case, positivists would (and have) undoubtedly echoed this 
critique, asserting that the individual income tax, in every form, is valid 
manmade law, and thus binding despite the breadth of its scope. To think 
otherwise would destabilize the state of affairs. But is this a fair attack? Are 
such consquences truly attributable to Aquinas’ theory of natural law and 
by extension, the natural law approach to the tax system? Not on George’s 
account of Aquinas, at least with respect to the former.155 In fact, George 
explains that Aquinas’ natural law theory is highly nuanced, and despite 
misinterpretations by theorists such as H.L.A. Hart,156 “[n]othing in 
Aquinas's legal theory suggests that the injustice of a law renders it 
something other than a law (or ‘legally binding’) for purposes of 
intrasystemic juristic analysis and argumentation.”157 Aquinas believed 
rather, that “human positive law creates a moral duty of obedience,” but he 
also believed that because of man’s imperfection, this law is, at times, 
unjust.158 
Where then, does the Thomistic formulation of natural law leave the tax 
protester movement? Assuming the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment 
was indeed valid, does its expansion now preclude legitimacy under natural 
law? For Aquinas, a tyrannical law is “essentially a criminal type of rule;” 
unjust acts of tyrants are not only “devoid of moral authority,” but also 
“constitute a kind of criminality which can justify revolutionary violence for 
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the sake of the common good, and even tyrannicide, as a kind of resistance 
to, and/or just punishment of, the tyrant.”159 Does this mean that Aquinas 
would automatically endorse an upheaval of an “unjust” tax system? 
Certainly not. As George explains, Aquinas does not view the right of 
revolution as absolute, but he does view tyrannical rule as a “perversion of 
law,” which “gives rise to a (prima facie) right of resistance.”160 Applying 
this to the tax protester movement, if indeed the current form of the 
individual income tax can be deemed a “perversion of law,” natural law 
theory, as posited by Aquinas, would impose upon legislators the obligation 
to change the tax system through lawful means. As articulated by George:  
[W]here legitimate rule has degenerated into tyranny, the tyrants 
are entitled to something which we might call ‘due process of 
law.’ It is up to other public officials, operating as such, and not 
(ordinarily) to private citizens to overthrow their regimes and, if 
necessary, bring them personally to trial and punishment . . . .161  
Simply put, assuming the income tax is now overly expansive, the 
Thomistic tradition would impose upon lawmakers (i.e. Congressmen) the 
obligation, under natural law theory, to change whatever manmade law is 
deemed “unjust.” This change could be brought about for example, by 
lawfully repealing the Sixteenth Amendment and replacing the individual 
income tax with a sales tax alternative.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
A. Tax Alternatives: A Sales Tax System    
One solution for avoiding the legal problems associated with the 
constitutionality debate while also returning America to the guidelines 
envisioned by the Founders is to simply repeal the Sixteenth Amendment. 
Such repeal would lawfully address the issue of validity presented by 
Aquinas without resorting to revolutionary means. Whilst Aquinas permits 
the use of force against usurping tyrants,162 a revolutionary right is not 
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absolute,163 and a lawful repeal would therefore be very much in accord with 
the duty of public officials to redress legitimate rule that has devolved into 
tyranny.164 Assuming Schiff is correct in his formulation of the income tax 
as the “antithesis of liberty,”165 legislators would have an obligation under 
natural law theory to make new law that comports with eternal law by not 
infringing upon individual rights granted by the Creator.   
A burdensome income tax that infringes upon the individual’s economic 
freedom to such extent as to violate the right to property (i.e. the right to 
the fruit of one’s labor) also infringes upon the right to life. Just as 
Shakespeare’s Shylock equated the appropriation of wealth with the 
infringement on personal liberty, so too did the Founders view excessive 
taxation as an infringement on the right to life. Consent to any form of 
taxation, whether income or property, was viewed as a necessary protection 
against tyranny. The Stamp Act Congress, for example, noted that, “it is 
inseparably essential to the freedom of a people . . . that no taxes should be 
imposed on them, but with their own consent, given personally, or by their 
representatives.”166 As revolutionary lawyer Silas Downer once noted, the 
right to property, and thus to the fruits of one’s labor, was understood in 
the Founding era to be inextricably intertwined with the right to life: 
For if they can take away one penny from us against our wills, 
they can take all. If they have such power over our properties 
they must have a proportionable power over our persons; and 
from hence it will follow, that they can demand and take away 
our lives, whensoever it shall be agreeable to their sovereign wills 
and pleasure.167  
For Aquinas, there is no doubt that the government has a right to tax, but 
the question is how expansive that tax system should be. The rest of the 
passage from Romans 13 quoted above ends with an acknowledgement of 
the magistrate’s right to tax: 
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For the same reason you also pay taxes, for the authorities are 
God’s servants, busy with this very thing. Pay to all what is due 
them—taxes to whom taxes are due, revenue to whom revenue is 
due, respect to whom respect is due, honor to whom honor is 
due.168 
Contrary to popular misinterpretation, natural law theory as postulated by 
Aquinas evidently subjects civilians to government rule and imposes upon 
them the duty to pay taxes.169 This duty, however, is limited, as the plain 
language of the passage itself reveals, to what is “due” to the magistrate. 
Assuming the current tax rate is not reflective of what is actually due to the 
government, a sales tax substitute would reign in Caesar’s reach by leaving 
the federal and state governments with the sole tool of a sales tax to gather 
revenue. For transparency, the sales tax could be broken up to show citizens 
where their hard-earned money is going. For instance, if the total federal 
sales tax is five percent, half a percent could be used for border security, 
including the budget for the Armed Forces, one percent for domestic law 
enforcement, two percent for infrastructure and so on. Furthermore, if the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 were repealed, the power to coin money would 
return to Congress, as outlined in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.170  
This alternative tax system, which would also lawfully repeal the property 
and estate taxes, would notably decrease state revenues and by extension 
greatly reduce the influence of government in citizens’ daily lives. Indeed, 
such a regime would allow the federal government to downsize and focus 
instead on maintaining infrastructure, the integrity of the nation’s borders, 
and upholding contract law. State government would be tasked with all 
other matters.   
Such an alternative tax system would provide fairness by offering citizens 
a choice. The current income tax system, by contrast, leaves individuals 
with no choice to reduce confiscation of wealth, short of forgoing income. 
This alternative tax solution would allow an individual the election of 
lawfully avoiding the sales tax by simply not purchasing an item. The 
federal and state governments could also stimulate prosperity under this 
system by, for example, exempting capital goods such as factory equipment 
or farm machinery from the sales tax. Hence, individuals with means would 
have an incentive to reinvest earnings, thus creating prosperity and jobs for 
others rather than paying sales tax on consumable goods.  
                                                                                                                                      
 168. Romans 13:6-8 (New Revised Standard Version Catholic Edition). 
 169. George, supra note 149, at 1642 (explaining that Aquinas acknowledges that an 
unjust law is still a law for juristic analysis).  
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Simplicity and equity would be natural outcomes of shifting the state’s 
revenue stream towards a sales tax system. Individuals would not need to 
file annual tax returns since there would be no income tax. Businesses 
would only need to submit forms outlining the sales tax they have collected 
on behalf of the government. Accusations of “tax loopholes” and the like 
would be meaningless. An entire level of bureaucracy would be all but 
eliminated.   
The notion of responsible government would be restored since the 
government would be responsible to explain all parts of the sales tax to its 
citizens. The Federal Reserve would no longer be able to finance reckless 
government spending because its power to issue currency would be 
rescinded. With less income to misallocate, government waste on 
inefficiencies would also be greatly reduced. Finally, and most importantly, 
the formation of an accountable, limited government would restore 
Americans’ unalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  
B. Sanctioning Constitutional Challenges 
The sanctions and restrictions on Schiff’s speech are legal issues meriting 
entirely separate articles. In brief, both the Supreme Court and lower courts 
have dismissed challenges to the constitutionality of the income tax and 
repeatedly sanctioned Schiff for his appeals.171 The district court dubbed 
Schiff an “extremist” whose views make for unqualified constitutional 
interpretations:  
[T]he Second Circuit described Schiff as “an extremist who 
reserve[s] the right to interpret the decisions of the Supreme 
Court as he read[s] them from his layman's point of view 
regardless of and oblivious to the interpretations of the 
judiciary.”172 
The judiciary did not merely sanction Schiff for his appeals, but also limited 
his free speech by restricting the commercial sale of his book, The Federal 
Mafia. In United States v. Schiff, the court held that Schiff’s book, The 
Federal Mafia, was not protected by the First Amendment.173 Pursuant to 26 
U.S.C.A. § 7408, the government sought an injunction proscribing the 
                                                                                                                                      
 171. See, e.g., United States v. Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1268 (D. Nev. 2003) ( “Schiff's 
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promoters, organizers, and marketers of Schiff’s book from engaging in its 
commercial sale.174 The court reasoned that Schiff crossed the line from 
permissible to impermissible speech by promoting fraudulent activities.175 
In his defense, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) argued that a 
ban on the book constituted an “impermissible prior restraint.”176 The 
ACLU provided three reasons why The Federal Mafia cannot be classified 
commercial speech:  
(1) it does not fit the definition of commercial speech as 
proposing no more than a commercial transaction; (2) it is sold 
in bookstores and through the Internet independent of the tax 
scheme; and (3) it is not promoted through paid memberships 
involving face-to-face communication.177  
The ACLU essentially argued that the court ought to apply the “more 
stringent Brandenburg incitement standard before subjecting the book to 
the preliminary injunction.”178 The court rejected each argument. 
Central to the ACLU’s case was the claim that Schiff’s speech was not 
commercial but political.179 The ACLU argued that Schiff’s book contained 
“autobiographical and political expression” and therefore “[did] no more 
than propose a commercial transaction.”180 The court rejected this 
argument, reasoning that since the book instructs customers on the specifics 
of filing zero income returns, the injunction was rightly applicable to 
matters beyond mere advertisement: “The tax scheme's promotions identify 
the book as the starting point of the program, and represent that [i]t shows 
you how to file the zero return, stop your wage withholding, and explains 
the basics.”181  
The ACLU further contended that The Federal Mafia, marketed through 
Freedom Books and online, was not a “direct part of the [zero income] 
scheme.”182 Since the book was “sold independently in bookstores or 
online,” it was not directly related to the marketing of the scheme.183 The 
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court rejected this claim too, noting that the book was the starting point for 
the scheme.184 Of central concern to the court was the inclusion of a “how-
to” manual in the book itself.185 Since the book provided actual samples of 
zero returns, the court declared that the samples shifted the material from 
protected to unprotected. The First Amendment, by this particular court’s 
view, did not protect work that promoted illegal activity by providing 
instructions on its actualization:  
Far from containing merely commentary, information and 
expression of opinion regarding the legitimacy of the tax system, 
the book is, in part, a how-to manual directed to specific 
individuals seeking instructions, sample forms, and attachable 
affidavits to be used in the filing of false income tax returns and 
submission of false W–4s.186 
The line between permissible expression of opinion and impermissible 
instruction, however, has not yet been clearly demarcated. Would the mere 
exclusion of the “how-to” manual have afforded Schiff protection? Perhaps 
so, but are not many forms of expression also an instruction in some 
fashion? At what point does expression become instruction? Suffice it to 
say, such questions have certainly not vanished with Schiff’s passing.187 
Indeed, Mr. Irwin A. Schiff’s story will continue to ignite contentious 
debate. The spirited grandfather of the tax protester movement struck the 
core of the American psyche. As long as the current form of the income tax 
is around, Americans will continue to echo Shylock in asking what value 
there is in life if the fruit of one’s labor is continually plundered.  
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